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I. INTRODUCTION 
When considering any legal issue, a statute, caselaw, etc. there are 
several fundamental values vying for supremacy; two premiere interests 
in American jurisprudence are efficiency and fairness.  The recent 
Supreme Court case Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court is a 
modern example of this struggle.1  The case involved specific personal 
jurisdiction in a mass-action lawsuit, in a state court.2  One of the most 
basic elements of personal jurisdiction, specific, general, or any other 
variety, is fairness.3  In fact, it is the third and final test in determining 
whether specific personal jurisdiction will lie in a particular court.4  The 
primary arguments made in the majority opinion related heavily to the 
concept of fairness, due to its focus on interstate federalism and its 
concern that the suit at issue did not arise out of the contacts between the 
defendant and the forum state.5  In like fashion, the dissent was also 
concerned with fairness, but maintained that the majority’s ruling would 
impede the efficient resolution of mass action suits.6 
Personal jurisdiction, or in personam jurisdiction, is among the 
most basic prerequisites for a lawsuit, as it is the jurisdiction of the court 
over the parties involved.7  Personal jurisdiction is typically only 
relevant as to the defendant, or any third-parties to the suit, as it may be 
 
 1. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
 2. Id. The court was in California. 
 3. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Miliken v. Meyer, 
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
 4. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987). 
 5. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1777–84. 
 6. See id. at 1784–89 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 7. See Personal Jurisdiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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waived by any party,8 and, in a typical case, the plaintiff will have 
waived any objections simply by having brought suit.9 
The impact of the Bristol-Myers Squibb decision on personal 
jurisdiction in state mass actions suits cannot be overstated.  According 
to the majority, a state mass action suit that involves plaintiffs from 
multiple states must either demonstrate “a connection between the forum 
and the specific [non-resident] claims at issue,”10 split into separate mass 
actions for each of the states, 11 or the suit must take place in the home-
state of the defendant, wherein lies general personal jurisdiction.12  This 
ruling may increase the cost of mass action suits, in some cases 
drastically.  It will necessarily limit the applicable choice-of-law 
provisions and restrict who may act as counsel for the plaintiffs, and may 
impact other matters of great import. 
The Court’s holding, however, is limited to mass actions in state 
courts, under which the analysis proceeds under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.13  The Court specifically left open the question of “whether 
the Fifth Amendment imposes the same restrictions on the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction by a federal court.”14 
This Note first provides background information on personal 
jurisdiction15 and the Supreme Court ruling in Bristol-Myers Squibb.16  
The Note will then analyze how a hypothetical case identical to Bristol-
Myers Squibb, with the caveat of being brought in federal court under 
federal law, should be resolved.17  Finally, it proposes a general solution 
for how federal courts should analyze personal jurisdiction in mass 
action suits brought by both resident and non-resident plaintiffs.18  The 
writer suggests that the appropriate analysis in federal court should be 
similar to that performed by a state court.  In other words, the federal 
 
 8. See O’Brien v. R. J. O’Brien & Ass’n, Inc., 998 F.2d 1394, 1399 (7th Cir. 1993). 
“Unlike subject matter jurisdiction, which as a restriction on federal power cannot be waived, 
personal jurisdiction is ‘a legal right protecting the individual,’ which the defendant may 
waive.” Id. (quoting Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 
456 U.S. 694, 704 (1982)). 
 9. See Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67–68 (1938). For an example of a case 
examining personal jurisdiction in an atypical context, see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 
472 U.S. 797 (1985) (discussing personal jurisdiction over non-resident plaintiffs in a class-
action lawsuit). 
 10. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1781. 
 11. Id. at 1783. Thus, in a case like the one in Bristol-Myers Squibb spawning over thirty 
additional lawsuits. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 1783–84. 
 14. Id. at 1784. 
 15. See infra Part II.b. 
 16. See infra Part II.c. 
 17. See infra Part IV. 
 18. See infra Part V. 
456 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:59 
court should determine whether there are sufficient ‘minimum contacts’ 
between the defendant and the forum, so as to make the exercise of 
jurisdiction constitutional.  Under that analysis, mass actions of the type 
forbidden in state court may be permissible in federal court. 
II. BACKGROUND 
a. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
Amusingly, to set the stage for a proper discussion of personal 
jurisdiction, one must begin by examining subject-matter jurisdiction.  
Subject-matter jurisdiction could be considered the most basic form of 
jurisdiction, as it is the power of the court over the substantive claims of 
the case.19  Unlike personal jurisdiction, subject-matter jurisdiction 
cannot be waived by any party.20 
The primary sources of subject-matter jurisdiction in federal court 
are 28 United States Code (“U.S.C.”) Section 1331—federal question 
jurisdiction—21 and 28 U.S.C. Section 1332—diversity jurisdiction.22  
These statutes allow federal courts to hear two types of cases: (1) those 
involving a federal statute, a federal constitutional issue, a treaty, or 
other form of federal question, and (2) cases between parties from 
different states, or a citizen of a state and a foreign ‘subject.’23  The 
source of subject matter jurisdiction being utilized in a given federal 
court case has a significant impact on how the court will analyze 
personal jurisdiction.24 
 
 19. As opposed to the parties to the case. See Legal Information Institute, Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/subject_matter_jurisdiction (last visited Apr. 
26, 2018). 
 20. See supra note 8. 
 21. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2018). “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all 
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Id. 
 22. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2018). 
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in 
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is 
between— 
(1) citizens of different States; 
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state, except that the district courts 
shall not have original jurisdiction under this subsection of an action between citizens of a 
State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state who are lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence in the United States and are domiciled in the same State; 
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional 
parties; and 
(4) a foreign state, defined in Section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and citizens of a State 
or of different States. Id. 
 23. See supra notes 21–22. 
 24. See infra Part II.b.ii. 
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b. Personal Jurisdiction 
When determining whether to exercise personal jurisdiction, a court 
must make two separate inquiries.  The first is whether the exercise of 
jurisdiction in the specific instance is authorized by Congress (in federal 
court),25 or the state legislative body (in state court).26  The second is 
whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with the requirements of 
due process under the Fifth Amendment (in federal court) 27 or 
Fourteenth Amendment (in state court).28  The court may exercise 
jurisdiction only if said exercise is within the confines of constitutional 
authority under the relevant Due Process Clause and is authorized by the 
relevant legislative body.29 
There are four clear circumstances under which the Due Process 
Clause authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction: (1) when the 
defendant has been served while physically present within the 
boundaries of the forum state,30 (2) when the defendant has consented to 
being sued in the forum state,31 (3) when the defendant is domiciled 
and/or has their principle place of business within the forum state 
(general personal jurisdiction),32 and (4) when the defendant has certain 
‘minimum contacts’ with the forum state (specific personal 
jurisdiction).33 
This Note primarily discusses personal jurisdiction as applied to 
corporations, and therefore the ‘presence’ rule is not applicable, as 
corporations do not often travel to different states, where they might be 
served.  In addition, the consent rule will not be discussed, as a 
corporation that has consented to personal jurisdiction will never 
encounter the Fifth Amendment question discussed in this Note.  These 
two methods of obtaining personal jurisdiction therefore generally 
receive little attention in the corporate realm.34 
 
 25. Through either a federal statute, or, more generally, the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
 26. Through what is known as a “longarm statute.” See YEAZELL, STEPHEN C., CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 174–75 (7th ed. 2008). 
 27. The Fifth Amendment analysis is only utilized in certain circumstances, see infra 
Part II.b.ii.2. 
 28. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. 310. 
 29. YEAZELL, supra note 26 at 174–75. 
 30. See Burnham v. Super. Ct., 495 U.S. 604 (1990). 
 31. See Nat’l Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315 (1964). “[P]arties 
to a contract may agree in advance to the jurisdiction of a given court, to permit notice to be 
served by the opposing party, or even to waive notice altogether.” Id. at 316. Consent can also 
be found by implication or waived, although the circumstances of such are beyond the scope 
of this note. 
 32. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940). 
 33. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. 310. 
 34. With the possible exception of corporations fighting about whether they have 
consented to personal jurisdiction, over which this author has seen much ink spilled. 
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Compared with jurisdiction based on presence or consent, general 
personal jurisdiction is more frequently encountered in the corporate 
context.  General personal jurisdiction is the concept that a defendant 
can always be held to answer in its home state, regardless of where the 
actions at issue occurred.35  The Supreme Court stated that general 
personal jurisdiction is appropriate when “continuous corporate 
operations within a state [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to 
justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely 
distinct from those activities [that brought rise to the present suit].”36 
Further, “[a] court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign 
(sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all claims 
against them when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and 
systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.”37  
However, the Supreme Court has recently limited the situations where 
general personal jurisdiction applies.38  Given that the Court in Bristol-
Myers Squibb reaffirmed that a defendant can always be sued in his 
home-state, irrespective of the state or states from which any of the 
plaintiffs in a mass action hail, such is not at issue here.39 
This Note focuses on the ‘minimum contacts’ method of 
establishing personal jurisdiction, also known as specific personal 
jurisdiction.  A minimum contacts analysis arises in the following 
situations: (1) cases heard by state courts,40 (2) cases heard by federal 
courts applying state law,41 (3) cases heard by federal courts applying 
federal laws that do not provide for service of process,42 and (4) cases 
heard by federal courts applying federal laws that provide for service of 
process.43 
i. State Court 
As stated above, when considering the extent to which a state may 
exercise personal jurisdiction, the appropriate inquiry is twofold.  First, 
whether the state’s long-arm statute will allow the exercise of 
jurisdiction, and second, whether the exercise of jurisdiction is within 
 
 35. Milliken, 311 U.S. at 464. “One such incident of domicile is amenability to suit within 
the state even during sojourns without the state, where the state has provided and employed a 
reasonable method for apprising such an absent party of the proceedings against him.” Id. 
 36. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318. 
 37. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (citing 
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317).   
 38. See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct 1549 (2017). 
 39. See id. at 1783. 
 40. See infra Part II.b.i. 
 41. See infra Part II.b.ii.1.   
 42. See infra Part II.b.ii.2.a.   
 43. See infra Part II.b.ii.2.b.   
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the confines of the due process clause.44  Unlike in federal court, where 
the amendment used in the analysis depends on the law applied,45 state 
courts always utilize the Fourteenth Amendment, even when applying 
federal law.46 
The long-arm statute issue varies dependent on the state in question.  
For example, California’s long-arm statute is California Code of Civil 
Procedure Section 410.10, which states “[a] court of this state may 
exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution 
of this state or of the United States.”47  California’s long-arm is a highly 
liberal statute, which allows almost the full extent of personal 
jurisdiction.48  Other states may be more restrictive, but statutory 
analysis is at the root of the inquiry. 
Greater depth is required when analyzing whether the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction is constitutional.  The principle of basic fairness 
serves as the rationale for the Due Process Clause’s restriction of 
personal jurisdiction.49  A person should not be unexpectedly dragged 
into a faraway state to stand trial for an incident that neither occurred 
within said state, nor impacted the residents of that state.50  Hence, the 
common law rule of personal jurisdiction was that a state could exercise 
jurisdiction over any person found within its boundaries.51  There are 
three conditions for the modern exercise of specific personal 
jurisdiction: 
1. “[T]he defendant [must have] purposefully avail[ed] itself of the 
privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus 
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws”52 or have 
“purposefully directed its conduct into the forum state;” 53 
2. “[T]he plaintiff’s claim must ‘arise out of or relate to’ the 
defendant’s forum conduct;”54 and 
 
 44. YEAZELL, supra note 26, at 174–75.   
 45. See infra Part II.b.ii. 
 46. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” This holds true, regardless of under 
which law the State is ‘depriving’ a person of ‘life, liberty, or property.’   
 47. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10 (2019). 
 48. See id. 
 49. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 50. See id. 
 51. See Burnham v. Super. Ct., 495 U.S. 604 (1990). 
 52. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
 53. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1785 (2017) (Sotomayor, 
J., dissenting) (quoting J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. V. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 877 (2011)).   
 54. Id. at 1786 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 
414 (1984)). 
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3. The exercise of personal jurisdiction must not “offend ‘ traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” 55 
In determining this final factor courts are to consider “the burden 
on the defendant, the interests of the forum state, and the plaintiff’s 
interest in obtaining relief.”56  It must also weigh “the interstate judicial 
system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of 
controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering 
fundamental substantive social policies.”57 
The ‘purposeful availment’ factor requires an evaluation of the 
extent of the contacts with the forum state.58  Courts must consider the 
number of contacts, and the level of involvement with the contacts.59  
This is a fairly simple inquiry for a court to perform.  The ‘purposeful 
availment’ factor under the Fourteenth Amendment is also known as 
‘statewide contacts’ and is defined here for purposes of contrast with the 
concept of ‘nationwide contacts,’ discussed later in this Note.60 
Jurisdiction will lie in the state court if, and only if, the 
constitutional tests are met, and the state long-arm permits the exercise 
of personal jurisdiction.61 
ii. Federal Court 
In federal court, determination of personal jurisdiction depends on 
whether the court is applying state or federal law.62  Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure (hereafter “FRCP”) Section 4 governs personal jurisdiction in 
federal court.63  Additionally, if the case is based on state law, the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction must comport with the Fourteenth 
Amendment.64  If the case is based on federal law, the Fifth Amendment 
governs.65 
 
 55. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (quoting Int’l Shoe, 
326 U.S. at 316). 
 56. Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319–20. 
 59. See id. 
 60. See infra Part II.b.ii.2.b. 
 61. YEAZELL, supra note 26, at 174. 
 62. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k). 
 63. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4. 
 64. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
 65. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1784 (2017). 
Additionally, supplemental jurisdiction where, for example, there are both state and federal 
claims in the same case, is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1367; such is beyond the scope of this 
Note. 
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1. State Law 
When a federal court is hearing a case on the basis of diversity 
jurisdiction,66 and therefore applying state law, the FRCP state that 
“[s]erving a summons . . . establishes personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general 
jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located.”67  In other 
words, the federal court is to consider the situation in the same way as 
that state’s court would, and apply the Fourteenth Amendment 
‘minimum contacts’ analysis, as well as that state’s long-arm statute.68  
Therefore, in this instance, the federal analysis is precisely the same as 
the state analysis. 
2. Federal Law 
Even when hearing a case on the basis of federal question 
jurisdiction69 the federal court may still need to use the state-level 
analysis.  The FRCP state that “[s]erving a summons . . . establishes 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant when authorized by federal 
statute.”70  Thus, when federal statutes do not authorize federal personal 
jurisdiction, the federal court must analyze the issue in the same way as 
the relevant state court would, which “leads to the prospect of a federal 
court refusing to adjudicate a federal claim because the courts of the state 
in which it sits could not accept jurisdiction.”71  Meaning, there may be 
a situation in which neither federal nor state court has jurisdiction.72  
While this is certainly ‘anomalous,’ “it would be equally anomalous to 
utilize a state long-arm rule to authorize service of process in a manner 
that the state body enacting the rule could not constitutionally 
authorize.”73  Therefore, federal statutes that are silent as to service of 
process are treated differently from those that speak on the subject.74 
 
 66. See supra Part II.a. 
 67. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A). 
 68. See supra Part II.b.i. 
 69. See supra Part II.a. 
 70. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(C). 
 71. Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 296 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 72. See id.   
 73. Id. (quoting De James v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 284 (3d Cir. 
1981)). 
 74. See id. at 297. 
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a. Silent as to Service of Process 
When a federal statute is silent as to service of process FRCP 
4(k)(1)(C) no longer applies, nor does FRCP 4(k)(1)(B),75 only FRCP 
4(k)(1)(A) is applicable.76  This means that the appropriate analysis is 
the same as that used in state-court.77 
b. Authorizes Service of Process 
When a federal statute authorizes service of process, the FRCP 
authorizes personal jurisdiction.78  In this case, and this case alone, the 
appropriate inquiry becomes whether the Fifth Amendment, rather than 
the Fourteenth, will allow personal jurisdiction.79 
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is “essentially a 
recognition of the principles of justice and fundamental fairness in a 
given set of circumstances.”80  The ‘minimum contacts’ analysis, set out 
in International Shoe, was the Court’s attempt to ensure that personal 
jurisdiction honored these core values.81  Thus, perhaps the Fifth 
Amendment should likewise impose the ‘minimum contacts’ inquiry; 
there are a number of cases across several states and circuits which, 
‘explicitly or tacitly’ have followed this approach.82  Additionally, 
Justice Stewart approved this approach in his dissent in Stafford v. 
Briggs.83 
Nationwide Contacts 
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, ‘purposeful availment’ requires 
that the defendant have certain contacts with the forum state.84  When 
considering the ‘purposeful availment’ factor in a Fifth Amendment 
 
 75. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(B) describes personal jurisdiction over “part[ies] joined 
under Rule 14 or 19 . . . “ Thus, it is only relevant when discussing third-party plaintiffs or 
defendants, or required parties. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 14  & Fed. R. Civ. P. 19. 
 76. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1). 
 77. See Max Daetwyler Corp., 762 F.2d at 295. “In the absence of a federal statute 
authorizing nationwide service of process, federal courts are referred to the statutes or rules 
of the states in which they sit.” Id. 
 78. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(C). 
 79. See Max Daetwyler Corp., 762 F.2d at 293. 
 80. Honeywell, Inc. v. Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1143 (7th Cir. 1975). 
 81. See 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 82. Honeywell, Inc., 509 F.2d at 1143 (citing Fisons Ltd. v. United States, 458 F.2d 1241, 
1250 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied; Fraley v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 397 F.2d 1, 3–4 (3d 
Cir. 1968); Volkswagen Interamericana, S.A. v. Rohlsen, 360 F.2d 437, 440 (1st Cir. 1966), 
cert. denied; Stanley v. Local 926 of Op. Eng., AFL-CIO, 354 F. Supp. 1267, 1271 (N.D. Ga. 
1973); SCM Corp. v. Brother Int’l Corp., 316 F. Supp. 1328, 1333–34 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Sec. 
& Exch. Comm’n v. Myers, 285 F. Supp. 743, 748–49 (D. Md. 1968); Japan Gas Lighter 
Ass’n v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219, 232 (D. N.J. 1966)). 
 83. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 554 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 84. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. 310. 
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context, the ‘forum’ has changed from a state to the nation.  Some courts 
have exercised a national contacts theory in this situation, stating that 
“the appropriate inquiry to be made in a federal court where the suit is 
based upon a federally created right is whether the defendant has certain 
minimal contacts with the United States.”85  The underlying basis of such 
is that “it is not the territory in which a court sits that determines the 
extent of its jurisdiction, but rather the geographical limits of the unit of 
government of which the court is a part.”86  In other words, rather than 
looking to the boundaries of the state in which the federal court sits, the 
federal court should look to the boundaries of the nation.87 
The national contacts theory has yet to be considered by the United 
States Supreme Court.  As far back as the Asahi case in 1987, the Court 
has refused to address this issue.88  That same year, in a note in Omni 
Capital International, Limited v. Rudolf Wolff & Co. the Court 
specifically stated they “[had] no occasion” to address this issue.89  More 
recently, the Bristol-Myers Squibb majority acknowledged the issue 
again, by way of citing Omni.90 
The Circuit Courts who have considered the national contacts 
theory, have often dodged the issue by finding a lack of a federal statute 
authorizing jurisdiction and thereby re-directing their analysis to that 
applied under the Fourteenth Amendment. 91 
The Third Circuit in Max Daetwyler Corp. stated, without deciding, 
that where a federal statute allows jurisdiction, the nationwide-contacts 
theory might well be constitutional.92  Even when there is no federal 
statute authorizing jurisdiction, there are certain courts that have found 
 
 85. Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer., 762 F.2d 290, 293 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing Edward 
J. Moriarty & Co. v. Gen. Tire & Rubber Co., 289 F. Supp. 381, 390 (S.D. Ohio 1967)). 
 86. Id. at 293–94. (quoting Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, 397 F. Supp. 287, 291 (D. 
Conn. 1975); see also Centronics Data Comput. Corp. v. Mannesmann, A.G., 432 F. Supp. 
659, 663–64 & n.1 (D. N.H. 1977); Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354, 357 (W.D. 
Mich. 1973); Alco Standard Corp. v. Benalal, 345 F. Supp. 14 (E.D. Pa. 1972)). 
 87. See id.   
 88. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 112–13 n.* (1987). 
 89. Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 102 n.5 (1987). 
 90. 137 S. Ct. at 1784. 
 91. See, e.g., Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 418 (9th Cir. 
1977) (Lanham Act does not authorize nationwide contacts); Superior Coal Co. v. Ruhrkohle, 
A.G., 83 F.R.D. 414, 418–20 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (likewise the Clayton and Anti-Dumping Acts); 
Amburn v. Harold Forster Indus., 423 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (likewise in patent 
infringement cases); Graham Eng’g Corp. v. Kemp Products Ltd., 418 F. Supp. 915, 919–20 
(N.D. Ohio 1976) (same); Ag-Tronic, Inc. v. Frank Paviour Ltd., 70 F.R.D. 393, 401 (D. Neb. 
1976) (same); Edward J. Moriarty & Co. v. Gen. Tire & Rubber Co., 289 F. Supp. 381, 389–
90 (S.D. Ohio 1967) (likewise the Sherman Act). 
 92. Max Daetwyler Corp., 762 F.2d at 295. 
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nationwide contacts permissible under the Fourteenth Amendment and 
the relevant long-arm.93 
However, given the ruling in Bristol-Myers Squibb, discussed 
below, it seems unlikely that this analysis continues to hold water, as the 
federalism interests articulated in Bristol-Myers Squibb run directly 
counter to the idea that a state’s long-arm can permit a nationwide 
contacts theory.94 
c. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court 
i. Background 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of San Francisco was 
a mass-action filed by over six hundred plaintiffs, eighty-six of whom 
live in California,95 against Bristol-Myers Squibb.96  Bristol-Myers 
Squibb is a Fortune 500 pharmaceutical company, incorporated in 
Delaware and headquartered in New York.97  It also maintains 
substantial operations in New Jersey, with over fifty percent of its 
workforce in New York and New Jersey.98 
Bristol-Myers Squibb engages in business-activities across the 
nation, including in California.99  It employs over 25,000 people 
worldwide.100  It has over four hundred employees, five labs, and a 
government-advocacy office within California.101  Bristol-Myers 
Squibb’s total revenues constitute roughly fifteen billion dollars.102 
The claims were based on California state law due to alleged 
injuries from the use of Plavix.103  Plavix is a prescription blood-thinner, 
originating in the 90s, that was heavily marketed and earned Bristol-
Myers Squibb billions in revenue.104  Plavix was not developed, tested, 
labeled, packaged, or approved regulatorily in California.105  Nor was the 
 
 93. See Honeywell, Inc. v. Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1975) (jurisdiction 
found under Illinois long-arm statute); Centronics Data Comput. Corp. v. Mannesmann, A.G., 
432 F. Supp. 659, 664 (D. N.H. 1977) (jurisdiction found under New Hampshire long-arm 
statute); Engineered Sports Products v. Brunswick Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722, 728 (D. Utah, 
1973) (jurisdiction found under Utah long-arm statute). 
 94. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
 95. Id. at 1778. The remaining plaintiffs reside in thirty-three other states. 
 96. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. 1773. 
 97. Id. at 1777–78; Id. at 1784 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 98. Id. at 1778 (majority opinion). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 1784 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 101. Id. at 1778 (majority opinion); Id. at 1786 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 102. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1784 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 103. Id. at 1778 (majority opinion). 
 104. Id. at 1784 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 105. Id. at 1778 (majority opinion). 
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marketing strategy for Plavix developed in California.106  Rather, there 
was a nationwide marketing campaign, utilizing the same ads in every 
state.107 
Between 2006 and 2012, roughly 187 million Plavix pills were sold 
in California, earning Bristol-Myers Squibb over $900 million, roughly 
one percent of Bristol-Myers Squibb’s nationwide sales revenue.108  
Plavix was distributed through a few wholesalers, including McKesson, 
a California-based corporation, who was a defendant in the lower court 
case.109  McKesson’s distribution of Bristol-Myers Squibb’s products 
generated nearly one-quarter of Bristol-Myers Squibb’s revenue.110 
Originally, eight separate complaints were filed in California 
Superior Court, each asserting thirteen claims.111  None alleged that the 
non-resident plaintiffs had obtained Plavix through any California 
source, nor did the plaintiffs claim that they were treated with Plavix in 
California, nor injured by Plavix in California.112 
Bristol-Myers Squibb moved to dismiss under California Code of 
Civil Procedure Section 418.10(a)(1),113 claiming the court lacked 
personal jurisdiction over the claims by the non-resident plaintiffs.114  
The Superior Court denied this motion, claiming to have general 
jurisdiction over Bristol-Myers Squibb due to “[its] extensive activities 
in California.”115  Bristol-Myers Squibb petitioned the Court of Appeal 
for a writ of mandate, which was denied.116 
 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 1784 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 108. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1778. 
 109. Id. at 1784 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).   
 110. Id. 
 111. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct., 377 P.3d 874, 878 (Cal. 2016), rev’d, 137 S. 
Ct. 1773. The claims in each of the cases were: strict products liability (design and 
manufacturing defects), negligence, breach of implied warranty, breach of express warranty, 
deceit by concealment, negligent misrepresentation, fraud by concealment, unfair 
competition, false or misleading advertising, injunctive relief for false or misleading 
advertising, wrongful death, and loss of consortium; It is also worth noting that Bristol-Myers 
Squibb acknowledged that the claims brought by the non-resident plaintiffs are “materially 
identical” to those of the resident plaintiffs. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1785 
(Sotomayor, J. dissenting). 
 112. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1778 (majority opinion). 
 113. In pertinent part: 
(a) A defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time 
that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more 
of the following purposes: 
(1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him 
or her. Cal. Code of Civ. P. 418.10(a)(1) (2019). 
 114. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct., 228 Cal. App. 4th 605, 612 (2014), remanded 
to, 1 Cal. 5th 783, rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1773. 
 115. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1778. 
 116. Id. 
466 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:59 
After the denial, the United States Supreme Court decided Daimler 
AG v. Bauman, limiting the scope of general personal jurisdiction. 117  
The California Supreme Court instructed the Court of Appeal “to vacate 
its order denying mandate and to issue an order to show cause why relief 
sought [sic] in the petition should not be granted.”118  The Court of 
Appeal capitulated on the question of general jurisdiction,119 but found 
that specific jurisdiction was present.120  The California Supreme Court 
unanimously affirmed the decision regarding general jurisdiction,121 and 
non-unanimously affirmed regarding specific jurisdiction.122 
The majority123 applied a “sliding scale approach to specific 
jurisdiction,”124 and stated that “the more wide ranging the defendant’s 
forum contacts, the more readily is shown a connection between the 
forum contacts and the claim.”125  Under this test, the majority concluded 
that Bristol-Myers Squibb had sufficient contacts with California to 
permit specific jurisdiction “based on a less direct connection between 
[Bristol-Myers Squibb’s] forum activities and plaintiffs’ claims than 
might otherwise be required.”126  The majority justified its holding based 
on the similarity of the non-resident’s claims to those of the California 
residents, and noted that Bristol-Myers Squibb conducted research 
within the state.127 
The dissenting justices128 stated that “the claims of . . . nonresidents 
injured by their use of Plavix they purchased and used in other states . . . 
in no sense arise from [Bristol-Myers Squibb’s] marketing and sales of 
Plavix in California,” and that “mere similarity” of the claims was 
insufficient to establish specific personal jurisdiction.129 
 
 117. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
 118. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. 1778 (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. 
Super. Ct., 2014 Cal. LEXIS 1579). 
 119. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 228 Cal. App. 4th 605 (2014). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct., 1 Cal. 5th 783 (2016). 
 122. Id. 
 123. The opinion was written by Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye, joined by Justices Liu, 
Cuellar, and Kruger. Id. at 783, 788. 
 124. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 1 Cal. 5th at 806. 
 125. Id. (quoting Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc., 14 Cal. 4th 434, 455 
(1996)). 
 126. Id. 
 127. See id. 
 128. The dissent was written by Justice Werdegar, joined by Justices Chin and Corrigan. 
Id. at 783. 
 129. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 1 Cal. 5th at 819 (Werdegar, J., dissenting). 
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ii. Majority Opinion 
The majority opinion was written by Justice Alito, joined by Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, 
Kagan, and Gorsuch. 
The Court began by stating that personal jurisdiction in state court 
is limited by the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the crux of any 
examination of specific personal jurisdiction is “the defendant’s 
relationship to the forum state.”130  The Court defined personal 
jurisdiction as “an affiliation between the forum and the underlying 
controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place 
in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State’s regulation,” and 
thus, “is confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected 
with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.”131 
The Court also stated that when considering the “burden on the 
defendant,” vis-a-vis questions of fairness and substantial justice, one of 
the main considerations may be federalism.132  This is due, in part, to 
concerns about “submitting to the coercive power of a State that may 
have little legitimate interest in the claims in question.”133  The Court 
also noted that “the States retain many essential attributes of sovereignty, 
including, in particular, the sovereign power to try causes in their courts.  
The sovereignty of each state . . . implie[s] a limitation on the 
sovereignty of all its sister states.”134  And that “at times, this federalism 
interest may be decisive,”135 quoting World-Wide Volkswagen for the 
proposition that: 
[e]ven if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience 
from being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State; 
even if the forum State has a strong interest in applying its law to the 
controversy; even if the forum State is the most convenient location 
for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of 
interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its 
power to render a valid judgment.136 
 
 130. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1779 (2017) (citing Walden 
v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985)). 
 131. Id. at 1780 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 
915, 919 (2011)). 
 132. Id. at 1776. 
 133. Id. at 1780. 
 134. Id. at 1780 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 
(1980)). 
 135. Id. at 1780. 
 136. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1780–81  (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 
444 U.S. 294). 
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The Court claimed to be simply applying settled principles 
regarding personal jurisdiction.137  Firstly, it repudiated the California 
Supreme Court’s concept of “sliding scale” specific personal 
jurisdiction. 138  The Court quoted the Goodyear case, which stated that 
“even regularly occurring sales of a product in a State do not justify the 
exercise of jurisdiction over a claim unrelated to those sales.” 139  It 
extrapolated that connections between the state and the defendant 
unrelated to the issue in a case do not meet the ‘arising out of’ factor of 
personal jurisdiction.140  Regarding resident plaintiffs, in whom personal 
jurisdiction lies, the Court said “a defendant’s relationship with a . . . 
third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis for jurisdiction.”141  
Thus, the Court dismissed the idea that because California plaintiffs 
could bring their claim, the non-resident plaintiffs could bring similar 
claims.142 
The Court then refuted the plaintiffs’ arguments under Keeton v. 
Hustler Magazine143 and Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts.144  Keeton 
involved a New York citizen suing Hustler for libel, alleging damages 
both inside and outside of her home state.145  The plaintiffs used this case 
to argue that the defendant’s forum contacts do not have to “give rise to” 
every claim in a case, instead it suffices for the claims to be “related to” 
those contacts.146  Thus, because the non-residents claims were caused 
by the same course of conduct, and were identical to the resident 
plaintiff’s claims, they were “related.”147 
According to the Court, the plaintiffs misunderstood the Keeton 
case.148  The Court stated that, in Keeton, the harm from within the 
plaintiff’s home state (which “gave rise to” the claim) established 
personal jurisdiction, whereas the harm outside that state had to do with 
the “scope of the case,” rather than “jurisdiction to entertain claims 
involving no in-state injury and no injury to residents of the forum 
State.”149 
 
 137. Id. at 1781. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 931 
(2011)). 
 140. Id. at 1781. 
 141. Id. (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1123 (2014)). 
 142. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1781. 
 143. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770 (1984). 
 144. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. 
Ct. at 1782–83. 
 145. See Keeton, 465 U.S. 770. 
 146. Brief of Respondents at 12, Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (No. 16-466). 
 147. Id. 
 148. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1782. 
 149. Id. 
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The plaintiffs used the Phillips case to argue that non-resident 
plaintiffs may join resident plaintiffs in complex litigation, as, in that 
case, non-residents were permitted to join a class-action in a Kansas 
court for “injuries [that] arose outside the forum.”150  The Court held the 
case completely irrelevant, as it is a discussion of the due process rights 
of non-resident class members, in a class action suit.151  The Court, in 
that case, explained that the jurisdiction in such situations is distinct from 
the ability of a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state 
defendant.152  Further, the Court mentioned, the defendant in that case 
did not raise its own due-process rights, and the Court did not reach that 
issue.153 
Finally, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that “[Bristol-
Myers Squibb’s] ‘decision to contract with a [McKesson] to distribute 
[Plavix] nationally’ provides a sufficient basis for personal 
jurisdiction.”154  Stating that a defendant’s relationship with a third party, 
unrelated to the instance at issue in the suit, is insufficient to grant 
personal jurisdiction.155 In addition, the Court noted that the plaintiffs 
made no claim of Bristol-Myers Squibb acting with McKesson in the 
instances at issue, and the plaintiffs had “adduced no evidence” to show 
who had shipped their Plavix.156  At oral argument the plaintiffs argued 
that “[i]t is impossible to trace a particular pill to a particular person . . . .  
It’s not possible for us to track particularly to McKesson.”157  The Court 
found that “[t]he bare fact that [Bristol-Myers Squibb] contracted with a 
California distributor is not enough to establish personal jurisdiction in 
the State.”158 
Overall, the Court held that there was an insufficient relationship 
between Bristol-Myers Squibb’s connections with the state of California 
and the claims of the non-resident plaintiffs at issue, and therefore that 
California courts had no claim to personal jurisdiction over Bristol-
Myers Squibb with regard to the non-resident plaintiffs.159 
 
 150. Brief of Respondents at 27–28, Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (No. 16-466). 
 151. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1782–83. 
 152. Id. at 1783 (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 808–12 (1985)). 
 153. Id. (citing Phillips, 472 U.S. 812 n.3). “Indeed, the Court stated specifically that its 
‘discussion of personal jurisdiction [did not] address class actions where the jurisdiction is 
asserted against a defendant class.’ ”  
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 1783. 
 157. Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (No. 16-
466) [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument]. 
 158. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1783. 
 159. See id. 1783–84. 
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iii. Dissenting Opinion 
The dissenting opinion was written by Justice Sotomayor, who saw 
the exercise of jurisdiction over the non-resident plaintiff’s claims as 
perfectly permissible.160  “A core concern of this Court’s personal 
jurisdiction cases is fairness.  And there is nothing unfair about 
subjecting a massive corporation to suit in a state for a nationwide course 
of conduct that injures both forum residents and nonresidents alike.”161  
Her analysis focused on the well-established rule that personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant requires “certain minimum contacts with 
[the State] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” 162  Justice 
Sotomayor also began her discussion by defining specific personal 
jurisdiction, and noting the three requirements for the exercise thereof.163 
Sotomayor then stated that Bristol-Myers Squibb certainly had 
“ ‘purposefully avail[ed]  itself’ . . . of California and its substantial 
pharmaceutical market.”164  Secondly, she stated that the claims “relate 
to” said availment, because all the plaintiffs were “injured by the same 
essential acts,” the nationwide advertising campaign.165  And finally, she 
found no issue of unfairness in this case, given that the claims are 
fundamentally identical, and therefore it would be less efficient for the 
parties to litigate the non-residents claims separately, possibly in as 
many as thirty-four distinct suits.166 
Sotomayor systematically examined the cases cited by the majority 
and found them wanting.167  While the majority used Walden to argue 
that Bristol-Myers Squibb’s conduct in California was unrelated to the 
claims of the non-resident plaintiffs,168 Sotomayor claimed that Walden 
was irrelevant.169  According to Sotomayor, Walden clarified that 
“purposeful availment” was the first requirement of specific personal 
jurisdiction.170  Sotomayor did not see any discussion of the 
“relationship” requirement, and stated that “[o]nly if its language is taken 
out of context . . . can Walden be made to seem relevant to the case at 
hand.”171  She supported this claim by noting that such was the 
 
 160. See id. at 1784–89 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 161. Id. at 1784. 
 162. Id. at 1785. 
 163. Id. at 1785–86. 
 164. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1786 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 165. Id. 
 166. See id. at 1786–87. 
 167. See id. at 1787–88. 
 168. See id. at 1781–82 (majority opinion). 
 169. See id. at 1787 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 170. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1787 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 171. Id. 
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understanding of the lower court in that case,172 the understanding of the 
parties, and the amicus curiae,173 and that commentators have understood 
the case in that light.174 
Moving to Keeton, Sotomayor argued that the majority’s attempt to 
distinguish this case from Bristol-Myers Squibb on the basis of only 
having one plaintiff was misguided.175  She reasoned that Keeton also 
involved a corporation facing a penalty in a single-state for a nationwide 
course of conduct, and that the difference between the plaintiff in that 
case and the multitudes here was not significant.176  Sotomayor focused 
on the fact that in either event a corporation will be held to account for 
nationwide-conduct in a single state, and whether to one plaintiff or 
many, “Keeton informs us that there is no unfairness in such a result.”177 
According to Sotomayor, the primary motivation of the majority 
was interstate federalism, 
Indeed, the majority appears to concede that this is not, at bottom, a 
case about fairness but instead a case about power: one in which 
“ ‘ the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from 
being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State; . . . the 
forum State has a strong interest in applying its law to the 
controversy; [and] the forum State is the most convenient location 
for litigation’ ”  but personal jurisdiction still will not lie.178 
Sotomayor saw “little reason to apply such a principle in a case 
brought against a large corporate defendant arising out of its nationwide 
conduct.”179  She also questioned “[w]hat interest could any single State 
have in adjudicating respondents claims that the other States do not 
share?”180  And stated that she would return to the International Shoe 
standard of “fair play and substantial justice.”181 
Sotomayor concluded with her concerns regarding the practical and 
policy implications of the majority’s decision.182  Primarily, that 
plaintiffs injured in separate states are now only capable of bringing their 
suits in the home state of the defendant.183  She was concerned that such 
 
 172. Id.; see Fiore v. Walden, 688 F.3d 558, 576–82 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 173. Id.; see Brief for Petitioner 17–31, Brief for Respondent 20–44, Brief for United 
States as Amicus Curiae 12–18, in Walden, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (No. 12–574). 
 174. Id.; see 4 Wright §1067.1, at 388–89. 
 175. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1788 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 176. See id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 1788 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 
(1980)). 
 179. Id. at 1788. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct at 1788 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Int’l 
Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316). 
 182. See id. at 1788–89. 
 183. See id. at 1789. 
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a requirement, or the alternative, separation of suits on the basis of the 
state from whence the plaintiffs hail, will shift greater burdens to 
plaintiffs ill equipped to bear the cost and will prevent bringing corporate 
defendants to answer for their actions.184 
Sotomayor was also concerned that Bristol-Myers Squibb may have 
killed some suits before they were ever born.185  As an example she 
discussed nationwide mass actions against two or more defendants from 
different states.186  “There will be no State where both defendants are ‘at 
home,’ and so no State in which the suit against both can proceed.”187  
There will likewise be no state in which a nationwide mass actions could 
be brought against a foreign corporation.188  Such cases may find little 
purchase in the post-Bristol-Myers Squibb landscape, and therefore may 
simply wither and die, leading, according to Sotomayor’s earlier point, 
to a situation where smaller suits must be brought, with greater costs to 
plaintiffs.189 
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court has left a hole in the 
landscape of mass-action personal jurisdiction.190  Whereas before a 
group of plaintiffs could rally together and bring suit against a corporate 
defendant en masse in a state wherein some, but not all, of the plaintiffs 
reside and/or were injured, such is now an impossibility.191  This leaves 
few options for would-be non-resident plaintiffs: split the suit (thus 
increasing costs), bring suit wherever the defendant is subject to general 
personal jurisdiction,192 or attempt to bring the case in federal court.193  
Given that some defendants may be from outside the country, and 
therefore not subject to general jurisdiction in any state,194 or that a suit 
 
 184. See id.; Additionally, id. n.4 addresses Sotomayor’s concerns regarding the possible 
implications of this decision on class actions, which is beyond the scope of this note, but is 
nonetheless concerning. 
 185. See id. at 1789. 
 186. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1789 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 187. Id. 
 188. See id. 
 189. See id. 
 190. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. 1773. 
 191. See id. At least, the exercise of jurisdiction is now impossible as to the non-resident 
plaintiffs. 
 192. Id. at 1783 (suggested by the majority); Id. at 1789 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting) 
(criticized by Sotomayor, “[I]n a world in which defendants are subject to general jurisdiction 
in only a handful of States . . . the effect of today’s opinion will be to curtail—and in some 
cases eliminate—plaintiffs’ ability to hold corporations fully accountable for their nationwide 
conduct.”). 
 193. Id. at 1783–84 (suggested by the majority). Id. at 1789 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(largely ignored by Sotomayor). 
 194. See id. at 1789 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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may be brought against multiple defendants, who are only “at home” in 
different states,195 it seems inevitable that certain suits will be brought in 
federal court in an attempt to bridge the gap that this case has left 
plaintiffs facing. 
While establishing jurisdiction in such cases may be difficult,196 
Bristol-Myers Squibb may prompt litigants to try.  As noted previously, 
the Court has specifically refused to address this issue three times,197 
which shows that the specter of such a case is already rising.  Indeed, 
Sotomayor herself discussed the situations where a federal solution is 
the only remaining possibility.198  When that day comes, courts will be 
faced with the question examined here, whether it is constitutionally 
permissible, under the Fifth Amendment, for a federal court to exercise 
jurisdiction over the defendant(s) in a mass-action where not all of the 
plaintiffs were injured in the state where the federal court sits.199 
It may be that the Court can avoid the problem for a time, as, under 
the FRCP, personal jurisdiction must be authorized by a federal statute 
before a Fifth Amendment analysis can commence.200  Thus, if suits are 
brought lacking such a statute, the Court may be able to avoid the 
question for a time.  However, eventually the Court will have to confront 
this issue. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The purpose of this Note is to consider the situation that the Court 
reserved in Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court, namely, “whether 
the Fifth Amendment imposes the same restrictions on the exercise of 
[specific] personal jurisdiction by a federal court,” as does the 
Fourteenth Amendment by a state court.201  In order to accomplish this, 
this Note examines a hypothetical case, identical to the one at issue in 
Bristol-Myers Squibb in every aspect, except said case is brought under 
a theoretical federal statute that authorizes personal jurisdiction.  The 
issue of whether such a statute actually exists, and, if not, how such 
ought to be formulated, and the pros and cons thereof are beyond the 
scope of this note.  General personal jurisdiction will not be considered, 
nor will any situation that requires a Fourteenth Amendment analysis. 
 
 195. Id. 
 196. Indeed, it may be impossible without an act of Congress. See supra Part II.b.ii.2. 
 197. See supra notes 88–90. 
 198. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1789 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 199. See generally Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Super. Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
 200. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(C). 
 201. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1784. 
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a. Congressional Authorization 
The first thing to note is that the FRCP clearly authorizes the 
exercise of jurisdiction under our hypothetical statute, as “personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant” is “authorized by a federal statute.”202  
Assuming that the statute under which jurisdiction lies is unambiguous 
there can be no doubt that Congress has acquiesced to jurisdiction in this 
case, which satisfies the need for statutory authority. 
b. Constitutional Analysis 
The next step in the analysis is to determine whether the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction comports with due process under the Fifth 
Amendment.  The basic constitutional analysis in this type of case was 
set out by the Court in International Shoe, where the Court stated that 
“in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not 
present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum 
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” 203  This in turn 
was broken down into three requirements: (1) the defendant must have 
“purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities 
within the forum State,”204 (2) the instant action must “arise out of or 
relate to” the defendant’s forum contact,205 and (3) the suit must not 
offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”206 
International Shoe was based on the Fourteenth Amendment.207  
However, like the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment is 
essentially about fairness.208  Therefore, following the approach from 
Honeywell, Inc., and various other cases, the ‘minimum contacts’ 
analysis is still appropriate, despite the difference in circumstance 
between the instant matter and the scenario at issue in International 
Shoe.209 
i. ‘Purposeful Availment’ Requirement 
The requirement of purposeful availment is the ‘minimum contacts’ 
part of the ‘minimum contacts’ analysis.  That is to say, it is the part 
where the court must actually examine whether there are any links 
 
 202. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(C) (2019). 
 203. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 204. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. V. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 877 (2011) (quoting Hanson v. 
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). 
 205. Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984). 
 206. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. 
 207. See id. at 311. 
 208. See Honeywell, Inc. v. Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1143 (7th Cir. 1975). 
 209. Id.; see also supra note 82–83. 
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between the defendant and the forum (apart from the plaintiff),210 and if 
so, whether they are of sufficient quantity and/or quality to justify 
subjecting the defendant to the court’s jurisdiction.211 
As discussed above, when this issue is analyzed under the Fifth 
Amendment, the idea that the territorial bounds of the state in which the 
federal court sits should limit its jurisdiction ceases to be persuasive.212  
Rather, the bounds of the forum should be those of the sovereign, in this 
case, the nation itself.213  This eliminates the majority’s concerns with 
interstate federalism, as that conflict has necessarily ceased to be.214  
There can be no question of a “sister-state” invading a state’s 
sovereignty, if there is no ‘state’ exercising jurisdiction. 
Given our hypothetical case, parallel as it is to Bristol-Myers 
Squibb, the ‘purposeful availment’ element must be met.  The easiest 
way to make this argument is simply by noting that “Bristol-Myers 
[Squibb] does not dispute that it has purposefully availed itself of 
California’s markets”215, and by noting that Bristol-Myers Squibb is 
based in New York and incorporated in Delaware.216  Also, Bristol-
Myers Squibb has over fifty percent of its workforce in those two states 
(with, presumably, a fairly substantial amount of its remaining 
workforce in the United States), and that it marketed Plavix on a 
nationwide basis within the United States, earning billions of dollars of 
revenue.217  These facts must be sufficient to find that Bristol-Myers 
 
 210. See Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2014). 
 211. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319. “The test is not merely, as has sometimes been 
suggested, whether the activity, which the corporation has seen fit to procure through its 
agents in another state, is a little more or a little less [citations omitted]. Whether due process 
is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair 
and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to 
insure.” Id. 
 212. Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287, 291 (D. Conn. 1975). “[I]t is 
not the territory in which a court sits that determines the extent of its jurisdiction, but rather 
the geographical limits of the unit of government of which the court is a part.” Id. 
 213. See id. It is worth noting that the court in Cryomedics saw this analysis as especially 
applicable to alien defendants, as “[w]hen a defendant is a citizen of the United States, there 
are very real differences in convenience between litigating in a state where it does business or 
resides, and in one where it has only insignificant contacts.” Id. at 292. However, this author 
would argue that those concerns are best dealt with in the ‘fairness’ inquiry, and therefore 
should not impact the analysis of ‘purposeful availment.’ 
 214. Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 295 (3d Cir. 1985). “[T]he 
present fifth amendment due process inquiry need not address concerns of interstate 
federalism, [but] it must still consider the remaining elements of the minimum contacts 
doctrine as developed by International Shoe and its progeny.” Id. 
 215. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1787 (2017) (Sotomayor, 
J., dissenting). 
 216. Id. at 1777–78. 
 217. Id. 
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Squibb has “purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privileges of conducting 
activities within the forum,”218 in this case the United States. 
ii. ‘Arising out of’ Requirement 
The ‘arising out of’ factor was, for the majority, the crucial missing 
piece of the analysis; they could not see a link between Bristol-Myers 
Squibb’s activities in California, extensive as they may have been, and 
the possible harm to the non-resident plaintiffs.219  When the scope of 
the forum is the United States, however, a different outcome is likely. 
The instant case must “arise out of or relate to” the defendant’s 
forum contacts. 220  In a Fifth Amendment analysis the forum is the 
United States.  Therefore, given that the plaintiffs allege injuries 
sustained within the United States, or that were caused by Plavix 
purchased in the United States, or at very least through Plavix that was 
created or distributed in the United States—a fact that the Defendant did 
not, and could not, refute—there must be a connection between the 
Defendant’s forum contacts and the instant case. 221 
Under typical circumstances the above analysis might suffice as a 
demonstration that the instant conflict is “related to” the defendant’s 
forum conduct; however, given the concern of the majority in Bristol-
Myers Squibb that the ‘arising out of’ element was not met, more depth 
may be desirable. 
It cannot be argued that in this instance jurisdiction would be 
outside “[the] adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, 
the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.”222  Nor can it be 
argued that the defendant will be “submitting to the coercive power of a 
State that may have little legitimate interest in the claims in question,” 
223 because, if a state can be concerned with the protection of its citizens, 
how can the federal government be disallowed that same motive.  And, 
as previously stated, issues of interstate sovereignty ought not prevent 
the federal government from exercising jurisdiction.224 
Unlike in the state version of the case, all of the plaintiffs were now 
injured within the bounds of the forum.  While some parts of the analysis 
remain constant, such as the non-helpfulness of McKesson (given that 
particular doses of Plavix still are “impossible to trace . . . particularly to 
McKesson.”225), they cease to be material, given the other connections 
 
 218. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
 219. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1781–82. 
 220. Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984). 
 221. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1778–79. 
 222. Id. at 1780. 
 223. Id. 
 224. See supra Part IV.b.i. 
 225. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 157. 
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between Bristol-Myers Squibb’s contacts within the forum and the 
litigation at bar.226  Further, because of the breadth of the forum 
compared with the original case, presumably one could look at all of the 
distributors used by Bristol-Myers Squibb to distribute Plavix in the 
U.S., and, assuming that all distributors were domestic, utilize that 
linkage.  Although why one would feel the need to do so is beyond this 
author. 
iii. ‘Fairness’ Requirement 
The final requirement for the exercise of personal jurisdiction to be 
constitutional is that said exercise comport with “traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice,” or, in other words, be reasonable under 
the circumstances.227  Factors in assessing this element include 
[1] the burden on the defendant, [2] the forum State’s interest in 
adjudicating the dispute, [3] the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining 
convenient and effective relief, [4] the interstate judicial 
system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of 
controversies, and [5] the shared interest of the several States in 
furthering fundamental substantive social policies.228 
Additionally, (6) a federalism interest is to be considered, which 
“may be decisive.”229 
Conventional wisdom, insofar as this author is aware, is that the 
‘fairness’ requirement is the least important.  If the first two 
requirements are met, it is highly unlikely that a lack of fairness will 
prevent jurisdiction.  There are certainly instances where the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction would be unfair, but such are typically coupled with 
a lack of “purposeful availment” or a sufficient “relation” between the 
defendant’s connections to the forum and the case at bar.230  However, 
because this is a somewhat novel area, and because the Court has refused 
to consider the issue three times, it may be that a somewhat deeper 
analysis of the fairness factors is called for. 
Before beginning this analysis, it is worth noting that, 
“remarkably—[Bristol-Myers Squibb did not] argue below that it would 
be ‘unreasonable’ for a California court to hear respondents’ claims.”231  
Given that, this author believes it is unlikely that Bristol-Myers Squibb 
 
 226. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1777–78. 
 227. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. 
Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 113–14 (1987). 
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would argue that federal court is an “unreasonable” place for the case to 
be heard, nonetheless, a more thorough analysis follows. 
1. The Burden on the Defendant 
The burden on Bristol-Myers Squibb here cannot be considered 
severe.  Even if the federal court in our hypothetical is in California, and 
therefore as far afield as any location in the continental United States 
might be from the defendant’s home state(s), it cannot be said that such 
is an extreme strain on the defendant.  When discussing a multi-billion-
dollar company, the cost of a flight to the opposite side of the country, 
or the cost of hiring a firm to litigate outside of their home state, cannot 
be counted as too heavy a burden to bear.  Nor, it must be said, is there 
either of the heaviest of burdens on a defendant: that of surprise, or that 
of the foreign defendant, forced to defend itself in the American judicial 
system, rather than that of its home country.232  Despite this, even if this 
factor were to cut against personal jurisdiction, such is not controlling. 
2. The Forum State’s Interest in Adjudicating the Dispute 
Here, the “forum state” is the United States.  It can hardly be argued 
that the interest of the federal government is slight when a domestic 
corporation sells a drug, developed, at least in part, domestically, to 
domestic customers, resulting in harm to its citizens.233  The government 
certainly has an interest in protecting its citizens from harm by massive 
pharmaceutical corporations.  Therefore, this factor favors the exercise 
of jurisdiction. 
3. The Plaintiff’s Interest in Obtaining Convenient and 
Effective Relief 
Given the holding of Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court, the 
plaintiffs’ interest in obtaining relief in federal court must be quite high, 
as it is one of a very few remaining options where all of the injured 
parties will be able to bring joint suit.234  While it is still possible for 
them to do so in the defendant’s home state, the intent of Congress by 
 
 232. See Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F. 3d 1104, 1117 (9th Cir. 2002) (acknowledging 
that the burden on the defendant will typically be high when the defendant is a foreign person 
or entity). 
 233. The federal government’s interest is similar to the interests of California in the 
original case. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1787 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
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Permitting the nonresidents to bring suit in California alongside the residents facilitates the 
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conduct of both nonresident corporations like Bristol-Myers and resident ones like 
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 234. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. 1773. 
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(hypothetically) creating a statute to authorize this lawsuit would clearly 
vindicate the plaintiffs’ interest in obtaining federal relief.  Further, it 
can hardly be argued that it is not convenient for the plaintiffs to obtain 
relief in such a fashion, as it allows the plaintiffs the opportunity to 
litigate all of their claims concurrently, which is incredibly efficient, 
compared with litigating their claims separately.  Therefore, this factor 
favors the exercise of jurisdiction. 
4. The Interstate Judicial System’s Interest in Obtaining the 
Most Efficient Resolution of Controversies 
In this hypothetical, the defendant is a domestic corporation, 
therefore this is an easy requirement to meet.  The analysis would be 
more complicated in the case of a foreign entity.235  Given the alternative 
(separate suits in state courts), this is a highly efficient method of 
resolving the controversy.  While it could be argued that bringing the 
matter in the defendant’s home state would be just as efficient, that does 
not reduce the efficiency of this method.  Likewise, it is possible to argue 
that individual plaintiffs will require sufficiently separate inquiries as to 
make a joint suit impracticable, but that is a highly case-specific inquiry.  
In this case, Bristol-Myers Squibb’s activities were national in scope, 
people in all states saw the same commercials, purchased the same 
product, and, presumably, suffered the same injuries.236  Under such 
circumstances, it is hard to argue that a joint suit will be less efficient 
than several smaller suits.237  Therefore, this factor favors the exercise of 
jurisdiction. 
5. The Shared Interest of the Several States in Furthering 
Fundamental Substantive Social Policies 
This author does not know of any substantive social policies, 
regardless of the state at issue, that would be harmed by the exercise of 
jurisdiction in this hypothetical federal case.  The only thought that 
occurs is that a state might wish to protect its corporations by dealing 
with any lawsuits against them in its own courts.  This is not an interest 
that courts have recognized, insofar as this author is aware, and therefore 
this factor weighs towards the exercise of jurisdiction. 
 
 235. Not to say that a foreign entity could never be brought to account under this analysis, 
it certainly could. But see United States v. First National City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 404 (1965). 
“Great care and reserve should be exercised when extending our notions of personal 
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 236. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1784 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 237. At least, insofar as we are discussing liability. Damages must be a more 
individualized inquiry. 
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6. Federalism Interest 
Unlike in a state case, there is no interstate federalism interest at 
issue here.  Rather, the proper analysis is that of a classical federalism 
interest (the balance of power between the states and the national 
government). 238  Given the presence of our hypothetical federal statute, 
the argument that the states have a greater interest in adjudicating the 
conflict should probably fail.  If the case were against an international 
defendant then there might be a question of international-relations, then 
we would examine the interests of the foreign government as well.  
Because our hypothetical involves a domestic defendant, and because a 
federal statute is at issue, there is no reason that the states have a greater 
interest in addressing the issue.  Therefore, this factor favors the exercise 
of jurisdiction. 
7. Overall 
Considering all of the factors, only the burden on the defendant cuts 
against the exercise of jurisdiction.  It is worth noting that the majority 
in Bristol-Myers Squibb categorized this factor as the “primary concern,” 
in a specific personal jurisdiction analysis.239  However, as the Court 
mentioned in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, “where a defendant who 
purposefully has directed his activities at forum residents seeks to defeat 
jurisdiction, he must present a compelling case that the presence of some 
other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.”240  Even if 
the burden on the defendant weighs against jurisdiction, that factor 
probably doesn’t make out a ‘compelling case.’  Given the higher 
burdens possible for foreign defendants, or individuals having to defend 
a case far from home, 241 a national corporation facing domestic suit in a 
state where it does business is not too heavy a load.  And therefore, the 
exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable in this hypothetical. 
V. PROPOSAL 
The Court should find that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment permits federal courts, applying federal law that authorizes 
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service of process, to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over 
corporate defendants in a nationwide mass action. 
The Court should look to the analysis performed in state court (and 
federal court, when applying state law or federal law that does not 
authorize service of process) under the ‘minimum contacts’ analysis 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, first articulated in International 
Shoe.242  The crux of both the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments’ 
Due Process Clauses is fairness, and the ‘minimum contacts’ inquiry was 
designed to address this concern, and thus it is reasonable to treat them 
in similar fashion.243 
However, given the different forum in a federal case, some 
adjustments will need to be made.  These adjustments should be 
relatively minor.  The ‘purposeful availment’ factor should follow the 
nationwide contacts approach discussed by many courts, since 
restricting the federal court’s jurisdiction when applying federal law to 
a state’s boundaries makes no sense. 244  The ‘arising out of’ factor 
should remain the same as is in a Fourteenth Amendment analysis, 
although it is apt to be more readily satisfied, given the expansion of the 
‘purposeful availment’ factor. 
The ‘reasonableness’ factors should remain largely the same, but 
some changes are called for.  However, courts should take greater care 
in assessing these factors in a federal setting, as the stakes may well be 
higher than they traditionally are in state court.  Historically, courts have 
often given the ‘reasonableness’ factors short shrift, using a sort of 
gestalt feeling in lieu of a thorough analysis. 
The burden on the defendant, the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining 
convenient and effective relief, and the interstate judicial system’s 
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies should 
be analyzed in precisely the same way as they are under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, as these interests are unchanged despite the difference in 
forum.  Likewise, the “forum state’s” interest in adjudicating the dispute 
should be largely unchanged, merely adjusting to reflect the interests of 
the nation rather than a state. 
The shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental 
social policies needs a minor change as well.  The interests of the federal 
government, and its policies ought to be considered in addition to those 
of the several states.  This will allow a balancing to occur to determine 
whether there is some reason to hear the case in state court. 
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Finally, the federalism interest needs to shift radically in this 
situation.  The federalism interest was a heavy factor in Bristol-Myers 
Squibb,245 and must play out very differently in federal court.  The 
federal government lacks “sister states” “the sovereignty of [which] . . . 
implie[s] a limitation on [its] sovereignty.”246  The question is no longer 
one of ‘interstate’ federalism, but rather one of classical federalism (in 
the case of a domestic defendant), or international relations (in the case 
of an alien defendant).  This analysis will be performed in a similar way, 
but it is important to note the change in the players. 
These changes will enable the primary purposes of the ‘minimum 
contacts’ analysis to remain, despite the change in the actors in question.  
A non-adjusted system would cease to vindicate the ideals of “fair play 
and substantial justice.”247  The adjustments suggested will enable the 
court to accurately balance the relevant interests in a federal context, 
leading to a Fifth Amendment analysis that works as well as those 
followed by state courts under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
If the Court follows said analysis, it should, under this hypothetical, 
find that a mass-action against a domestic corporate defendant may be 
brought in federal court, without regard for the state in which the federal 
court sits.  The Fifth Amendment gives no reason why the physical 
location of the court should impact the analysis to such an extent.  In an 
actual case, wherein the facts are different, the Court may find the 
exercise of jurisdiction impermissible based on those facts.  However, it 
should not find the exercise of jurisdiction impermissible on a more 
general basis, as it did in Bristol-Myers Squibb. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court grossly 
reduced the possibilities for multi-state mass-actions in state court.248  
This ruling limits the ability of plaintiffs to recover from harm, increases 
their costs when they can do so, and forces them to split their suits, 
minimizing the media attention their cases receive and therefore the 
plaintiffs’ bargaining power. 
However, the Supreme Court specifically reserved the question of 
how a similar case would be resolved under the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause.249  Allowing federal courts to exercise jurisdiction in 
such circumstances would address the unresolved issues this case left 
behind.  This Note has demonstrated that there is no constitutional issue 
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with permitting such a case.  This author hopes that Congress will 
authorize personal jurisdiction in such circumstances, or clever lawyers 
will find existing law allowing jurisdiction in such cases, so that the 
Court can finally decide the question it has avoided for the past thirty 
years, thus allowing plaintiffs to once again recover in the most efficient 
possible manner. 
 
 
